

## **An Appraisal of Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy during War on Terror**

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### **ABSTRACT**

This paper seeks to analyze that why some nations to nuclear in the international structure for the sake of national security when nuclear is an expensive and hard option? Due to fragile geo-political position of Pakistan, security concerns have always forced her to find balance of power in the south Asian region through different ways. Having fought three major wars with India in 1948, 1965 and 1971 in an asymmetric military environment, Pakistan had been in disadvantageous position. War of 1971 in which Pakistan lost its Eastern wing (now Bangladesh, as an independent state) and nuclear explosion by India in 1974 forced Pakistan to follow the nuclear path. This paper analyzes the results of nuclear policy in the form of economic sanctions imposed by US and its allies, and reversal of US policy after 9/11 regarding sanctions against Pakistan. In the wake of 9/11 incident for joining the US led Global War on Terror, General Musharraf had announced that his objective was to save the nuclear and missile assets of Pakistan. This paper analyses that how Pakistani governments of General Musharraf, and Zardari from 2001 to 2013, had been under immense pressure through different coercive tactics ( from Dr. A. Q Khan’s network to safety of nuclear program) to ruin the Pakistani nuclear program which had proved to prevent wars between India and Pakistan since 1999 to 2013. What costs Pakistan had to pay and what benefits Pakistan gained due to nuclear program.

**Key Words:** War on Terror, Nuclear policy, Balance of Power, Cold War, Wars, Nuclear Safety. Dr. Qadeer Network. IAEA, Terrorists.

### **Introduction**

Why Pakistan started its nuclear program despite its weak economic situation, the answers goes back into history of its creation. Rivalry started between India and Pakistan since 1947 over the issue of Kashmir which is continued. This dispute over Kashmir caused the enduring conflict between the both adjacent neighbors. 1947–48, 1965, and 1971 were the years which witnessed the three major wars. Though the 1971 war was not fought for the Kashmir, but it proved very significant as this war caused the disintegration of Pakistan. Eastern wing of Pakistan was separated and became an independent state of Bangladesh. In the

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wake of 1971 war rivalry between the both neighbors reached its peak. Following dismembering Pakistan, India tested its first nuclear bomb in 1974. Though India had started its nuclear program in 1964 whereas Pakistan started its program very late almost after 8 years in 1972 to maintain the balance of power in the region and for its own safety and security in the wake of devastated military defeat and loss of half of the country in 1971. Since India already had started its nuclear program and was about to complete its full scale nuclear device and Pakistan was a later entrant in this field, India tested its first nuclear device in 1974 and created power imbalance in the region. In the wake of Indian nuclear testing the then Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto “made it clear following India's 1974 nuclear test that Pakistan would develop a nuclear weapon even if the Pakistani people had to eat grass. Perhaps no other statement better reflects Pakistan's determination to develop and maintain a nuclear deterrent against India” Files (2012).

### **Reasons of Nuclear Program**

Pakistan has always been prone to Indian threat since beginning therefore “Pakistan's security concerns have always been directed towards India. Having emerged from India's womb as a separate homeland for Indian Muslims, Pakistan has been consumed with a feeling of a threat to its existence from its larger, stronger and often unaccommodating neighbor. The two states have had four wars (1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999) and numerous crises” (Nayyar 2008).

In order to keep the country secure from external threats Pakistan had to spend a considerable portion of her resources to balance India which hampered the national economic development which ultimately turned Pakistan's political economy from developmental to defense oriented economy. Following the first war in 1948 between the both neighboring countries over Kashmir, Pakistan started looking for military alliance in order to balance India. In early 50s Pakistan became member of CETO and CENTO military alliances and received substantial military aid from US.

Due to its geopolitical location in South Asia where three large and important countries like India, China and Russia, Pakistan always faced the problems of security and survival. Therefore, with regard to foreign policy Pakistan has always set three main objectives:

- “Security from any attack emerging from the north,
- Adequate defense from her more powerful neighbor in the event of war, and

- To achieve undoubtedly a position of comparative bargaining strength vis-a-vis India in the long-drawn-out dispute over Kashmir” Wallbank (1958).

As a matter of fact Pakistan has always tried to correct the imbalance of power in regards to India. State actors have two choices in order to deal with perceived aggressors in International system. Best way is to create balance against perceived aggressor state through their own capabilities which is known as “internal balancing” or by “external balancing” through which a state makes alliance with like-minded state to counter the perceived aggressor state. On the contrary there is another option left with states in the form of “bandwagon” in which primary objective is to avoid becoming a victim. Due to insufficient resources Pakistan was unable to internally balance India therefore International structure compelled Pakistan to seek external balancing and form alliances, namely SEATO in 1954 and later CENTO in 1955 with western countries.

According to a Pakistani retired general “we knew from the mid-60s that India was seeking the bomb. Given that, any Pakistani who did not want to get the bomb too would have been either a complete fool or a traitor. We needed the bomb at all costs for exactly the same reason NATO needed the bomb in the Cold War, faced with overwhelming Russian tank forces threatening you in Europe. So how can you criticize us?” Lieven (2011).

### **Sanctions Pakistan faced Due to Nuclear Program**

When nuclear tests were conducted in Pakistan in May 1998, economic conditions were worst, for instance Pakistan was under heavy foreign debt of \$ 30 billion whereas foreign currency reserves had merely worth of \$ 600 million. Since Pakistan had been borrowing foreign debt since long and on this occasion it was not possible to repay the next upcoming installment of IMF. Therefore in such a situation economic aid was crucial for the country like Pakistan, but for national security and balance of power in the region there had no other option left with Pakistan except nuclear testing.

Following the sanctions against Pakistan, Saudi Arabia demonstrated solidarity and offered to provide oil, much needed for the poor economy of Pakistan. “In May 1998 when Pakistan was deciding whether to respond to India’s test of five nuclear weapons, the Saudis promised 50,000 barrels per day of free oil to help the Pakistanis to cope with the economic sanctions that might be triggered by a counter test. The Saudi oil commitment was a key to then Prime Minister

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Nawaz Sharif's decision to proceed with testing. It cushioned the subsequent US and EU sanctions on Pakistan considerably" (Riedel 2008).

Saudi assistance in the form of Oil provision valued at over \$ 500 million per annum. This assistance spread over 5 years and later transformed into grant.

### **9/11 and its Impact on Nuclear Program of Pakistan**

Before Bush junior, South Asia was not on priority in the foreign policy of US following the collapse of USSR as one of the main objectives of cold war was achieved in Afghanistan with the help of Pakistan. Therefore Clinton administration has lost its interest in Pakistan.

"However, India-Pakistan crisis of 1990, South Asia's overt Nuclearisation in 1998 and the Kargil Conflict in 1999 were the main incidents which temporarily attracted American foreign policy makers towards the region in the 90's. US policy entailed sanctions on both India and Pakistan in 1998 and again on Pakistan in 1999 after General Pervez Musharraf's military coup. The role of US during the Kargil War was obviously an attempt to minimize the chances of full scale war between two nuclear states, not because America was seeing any long-term interests in the region. With this low priority milieu in foreign office for South Asia, President Bush started his first term as President of United States of America – the sole superpower of our time" (Javaid and Fatima 2012).

General Musharraf in his address to nation on September 16, 2001 in the wake of 9/11 incident explained his objectives in the new international situation "Our critical concerns are our sovereignty, second our economy, third our strategic assets (nuclear and missiles), and forth our Kashmir cause" (Musharraf 2002).

General Musharraf described his decision and objectives to join the US led war on terror and explained his objectives in his book "In the line of fire" in the following words "[T]he security of our strategic assets would be jeopardized. We did not want to lose or damage the military parity that we had achieved with India by becoming a nuclear weapons state. It is no secret that the United States has never been comfortable with a Muslim country acquiring nuclear weapons, and the Americans undoubtedly would have taken the opportunity of an invasion to destroy such weapons. And India, needless to say, would have loved to assist the United States to the hilt" (Musharraf, 2006).

Following the attack on Indian Parliament in Delhi on December 2001 situation became worst between India and Pakistan "Following the almost nuclear "Twin Peaks" crisis of 2001-2, Washington's friendly ties with India and Pakistan and steady support for Indo-Pakistani rapprochement have helped ease the way

toward dialogue, a cease-fire, and confidence building between the two countries” (Markey, 2007).

US shared with Pakistan her concerns over Nuclear proliferation particularly Dr. A. Q. Khan network, which was brought into the light in December 2003. A.Q. Khan was blamed for the supply of nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea. US wanted to investigate Dr. A. Q Khan through international investigators which Pakistan refused because it was an internal matter of Pakistan, but promised to exchange relevant information to the concerned parties if discovered any during Pakistan’s own inquiry.

Christina B. Rocca, Assistant Secretary for South Asia Affairs in a lecture in University of Pennsylvania's Center for the Advanced Study of India, Philadelphia, USA, said that “We are also working with Pakistan to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. President Musharraf has acted quickly and decisively to end the operations of A/Q/ Khan’s nuclear proliferation network. Dr. Khan and his associates are now being questioned, and we, Pakistan and other allies are using the information obtained to completely eradicate the network he created. We are working closely together to improve Pakistan’s export control system so that such damaging leaks of technology from Pakistan can never occur again” (Rocca, 2004).

“The investigation led to the February 2004 “public humiliation” of metallurgist Abdul Qadeer Khan, known as the founder of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and national hero, when he confessed to involvement in a proliferation network. Khan and at least seven associates are said to have sold crucial nuclear weapons technology and uranium-enrichment materials to North Korea, Iran, and Libya. President Musharraf, citing Khan’s contributions to his nation, issued a pardon that has since been called conditional. The United States has been assured that the Islamabad government had no knowledge of such activities and indicated that the decision to pardon is an internal Pakistani matter. Musharraf has promised President Bush that he will share all information learned about the Khan’s proliferation network” Kronstadt (2011).

### **American Suspicions and Pressure on Pakistan**

As per strategy US started putting pressure on Musharraf concerning missile and nuclear assets of Pakistan on two bases Musharraf writes in his book “In the Line of Fire” “We were put under immense pressure by the United States regarding our nuclear and missile arsenal. The Americans’ concerns were based on two grounds. First, at this time they were not very sure of my job security, and they dreaded the

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possibility that an extremist successor government might get its hands on our strategic nuclear arsenal. Second, they doubted our ability to safeguard our assets and prevent them from falling into the hands of freelance extremist groups or organizations” (Musharraf. 2006). On the other side India was using tactics to provoke Pakistan by blaming the backing of the non-state actors like *Lashkar-e-Taiba* and *Jaish-e-Mohammed* for the attack on Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001.

“13 December 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian parliament became the catalyst event for a nine-month military standoff, bringing South Asia once again to the brink of major war. The 2001–2002 military mobilization provided” (Lavoy. 2009).

A massive deployment by India created dangers of nuclear war in the region “By early January 2002 India had reportedly mobilized over 500,000 troops and its three armored divisions along the 3,000 km frontier with Pakistan. India also placed its navy and air force on "high alert" and deployed its nuclear-capable missiles. Pakistan reacted in kind, concentrating forces along the line of control that divides Kashmir. The deployment, which included troops in the states of Rajasthan, Punjab and Gujarat, was the largest since the 1971 conflict between the two rivals. Over 300,000 Pakistani troops are also mobilized” (Security, 2002).

On 25 December 2001, Jana Krishnamurthy, president of the ruling BJP party, warned Pakistan that “its existence itself would be wiped off the world map” if it attempted to use nuclear weapons” (Times. 2001).

Indian Defense minister George Fernandes threatened Pakistan in January 2002 that “We could take a strike, survive and then hit back. Pakistan would be finished. I do not really fear that the nuclear issue would figure in a conflict” (Fernandes, 2002).

The attack on Indian Parliament caused high tension between India and Pakistan. Prime Minister of UK Mr. Tony Blair visited India and Pakistan in January 2002 to calm down the tension, likewise in the month of May in 2002 US Deputy Secretary of state, Mr. Richard Armitage had to visit India and Pakistan to ease the situation as US was engaged in war in Afghanistan and Pakistani support for US was crucial.

Tony Blair was aware of the dangers of nuclear war between India and Pakistan as he was informed by chief of the defense staff Admiral Sir Michael Boyce on January 01, 2001” “if India and Pakistan go to war, we will be up the creek without a paddle. Geoff [Hoon] said there may have to be limited compulsory call-up of Territorial Army reserves. TB gave a pretty gloomy assessment re[garding] India/Pakistan, said [the Indian prime minister AtalBihari]

Vajpayee was really upset at the way [Pakistan's president] Musharraf treated him. Military dispositions remained the same, with more than a million troops there [in Kashmir]. He assessed that the Indians believed that they could absorb 500,000 deaths. Pakistani capability was far greater than the Indians believed" (Watt, 2012).

In April 2002 General Musharraf said in an interview to a German magazine *Der Spiegel*, warned India that "if the pressure on Pakistan becomes too great then "as a last resort, the atom bomb is also possible".....India had a "superpower obsession" and was energetically arming itself" (Rory McCarthy, 2002).

### **Pakistan's Nuclear Program, target of West and India**

Like many other well-known newspapers an American leading newspaper Washington Post published the WikiLeaks on November 30, 2010. According to this "The security of Pakistan's nuclear arms was a recurring theme in the released cables, beginning with a December 2008 US intelligence briefing to NATO noting, "Despite pending economic catastrophe, Pakistan is producing nuclear weapons at a faster rate than any other country in the world." In a cable to brief the new Obama administration before Kayani's February 2009 visit to Washington, US Ambassador Anne Patterson said that "our major concern has not been that an Islamic militant could steal an entire weapon, but rather the chance someone working in [government weapons] facilities could gradually smuggle enough fissile material out to eventually make a weapon and the vulnerability of weapons in transit." In May of last year, Patterson reported that Pakistan had reneged on an agreement to allow the United States to remove an aging stockpile of highly enriched uranium at a research nuclear reactor. The Pakistanis worried, she said, that the media would get wind of the removal and "portray it as the United States taking Pakistan's nuclear weapons." The following month, in a briefing prepared for a visit by then-national security adviser James L. Jones, Patterson said Pakistan had gone "on the defensive" about its arsenal after international media's reporting about US concerns. The Pakistani government, she wrote, "is particularly neuralgic to suggestions that its nuclear weapons could fall into terrorist hands and to reports of US plans to seize the weapons in case of emergency." In the cables, Pakistani officials complain about a US civil nuclear accord with India, their traditional adversary, and note that its provisions will allow Indians to divert materials to their own weapons program. Administration officials noted that the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons had been extensively discussed during a White House strategy review last fall. Although President Obama has made

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repeated public expressions of confidence in Pakistani safeguards, the issue remains one of high concern. "Why is it that we're trying to prevent the Pakistani government from collapsing?" one administration official said. "Because we fundamentally believe that we cannot afford a country with 80 to 100 nuclear weapons becoming the Congo"(DeYoung and Miller, 2010).

### **Concerns of Western World and First Use Doctrine**

What kind of the concerns US had regarding Pakistan's Nuclear Program, one of most important US official Michael Mullen, the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral defined in a speech on September 22, 2008. He said that "To the best of my ability to understand it—and that is with some ability—the weapons there are secure. And that even in the change of government, the controls of those weapons haven't changed. That said, they are their weapons. They're not my weapons. And there are limits to what I know. Certainly at a worst-case scenario with respect to Pakistan, I worry a great deal about those weapons falling into the hands of terrorists and either being proliferated or potentially used. And so, control of those, stability, stable control of those weapons is a key concern. And I think certainly the Pakistani leadership that I've spoken with on both the military and civilian side understand that" (Paul K. Kerr, 2013).

US officials initially created confusions about Pakistan's Nuclear Program and later expressed confidence in the safety of Pakistan's nuclear assets.

Doubts by US officials were created in 2009 that Pakistani government was on the verge of either collapse or near-collapse, so there was probability that terrorists or militants could acquire nuclear arsenals of Pakistan. On March 31, 2009 in a testimony before US Senate General David H. Petraeus, the former Commander of US Central Command, said that "Pakistani state failure would provide transnational terrorist groups and other extremist organizations an opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons and a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks" (Nikitin, 2012).

On April 29, 2009, Obama discussed the issue of nuclear program of Pakistan in a press conference which was reported by Washington Post also. He said that, "I'm confident that we can make sure that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is secure, primarily, initially, because the Pakistani army, I think, recognizes the hazards of those weapons falling into the wrong hands. We've got strong military-to-military consultation and cooperation." ..... "[w]e want to respect their sovereignty, but we also recognize that we have huge strategic interests, huge national security interests in making sure that Pakistan is stable and that you don't



end up having a nuclear-armed militant state.” .....“confident that that nuclear arsenal will remain out of militant hands” (Service, 2009).

On November 16, 2009 Seymour M. Hersh wrote in *The New Yorker* “High-level cooperation between Islamabad and Washington on the Pakistani nuclear arsenal began at least eight years ago. Former President Musharraf, when I interviewed him in London recently, acknowledged that his government had held extensive discussions with the Bush Administration after the September 11th attacks, and had given State Department nonproliferation experts insight into the command and control of the Pakistani arsenal and its on-site safety and security procedures. Musharraf also confirmed that Pakistan had constructed a huge tunnel system for the transport and storage of nuclear weaponry. “The tunnels are so deep that a nuclear attack will not touch them,” Musharraf told me, with obvious pride. The tunnels would make it impossible for the American intelligence community—“Big Uncle,” as a Pakistani nuclear-weapons expert called it—to monitor the movements of nuclear components by satellite” (HERSH, 2009).

In April 2011, Gary Samore, National Security Council Coordinator for Arms Control and Non- Proliferation, described in an interview to a magazine *Arms Control Today* that “The Pakistani government takes the nuclear security threat very seriously, and they’ve put a lot of resources into trying to make sure that their nuclear facilities and materials and weapons are well secured. There’s no lack of recognition that this is a very important issue, and there’s no lack of incentive on the part of the Pakistani government to maintain control. What I worry about is that, in the context of broader tensions and problems within Pakistani society and polity—and that’s obviously taking place as we look at the sectarian violence and tensions between the government and the military and so forth—I worry that, in that broader context, even the best nuclear security measures might break down. You’re dealing with a country that is under tremendous stress internally and externally, and that’s what makes me worry. They have good programs in place; the question is whether those good programs work in the context where these broader tensions and conflicts are present” (Peter Crail, 2011).

Following the US raid on Osama’s compound in Abbottabad on May 2, 2011 The State Department’s spokesman Mark Toner told in a press briefing on May 26, 2011, that “the safeguard and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are of concern, but ... it’s an issue that we discussed with the Pakistani government, and we’re sure that they’re under safeguard”(Toner, 2011). He again said on November 9, 2011, that “We have confidence that the government of Pakistan is well aware of the range of potential threats to its nuclear arsenal and is accordingly giving

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very high priority to securing its nuclear weapons and materials effectively” (Gull, 2011).

“US intelligence officials have articulated similar assessments. Then-Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence February 3, 2010, that “from what we see of ... measures that they take,” Pakistan is keeping its nuclear weapons secure. Lieutenant General Burgess, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, stated in March 10, 2011, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee that “Pakistan is able to safeguard its nuclear weapons, including protecting important segments of its nuclear program in underground facilities,” but added that “vulnerabilities still exist” (Nikitin, 2012). This was kind of a mixed observation of satisfaction and suspicions by US policy makers.

Piers Morgan of CNN asked a question to ex-President of Pakistan Musharraf on May 26, 2011 that “[T]here is obvious frustration and concern in America, not least because, of course, Was Pakistan has a reputed -- at least 100 nuclear weapons. If the country continues to deteriorate in terms of stability, this becomes a very dangerous situation for the world” Musharraf replied the question “If Pakistan disintegrates, then it can be dangerous. Otherwise, if Pakistan's integrity is there, and which I'm sure it will be there as long as the armed forces of Pakistan are there, there is no danger of the nuclear assets or strategic assets falling in any terrorist hands” (CNN, 2011).

### **Nuclear Doctrine of Pakistan**

Following the nuclear tests in 1998 Pakistan relies on nuclear arsenal in order to prevent Indian belligerence. Therefore as a result of inclusion of nuclear weapons, Pakistan developed its nuclear doctrine. “Pakistan’s efforts to establish an effective nuclear force posture, strategic organization, use doctrine, deterrence strategy, and command and control system were severely complicated, but also ultimately facilitated, by three serious crises that occurred in the past five years: (1) the forced reorientation of Pakistan’s foreign and defense policies after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States and the subsequent US - led war on terrorism; (2) the 2001-2002 military standoff that nearly produced a major war with India; and (3) the revelations in early 2003 of the A. Q. Khan network’s illicit transfers of nuclear weapons technology and materials to Iran, Libya, and North Korea” (Lavoy, 2007).

Brigadier General (Rtd) Naeem Malik has summarized the nuclear doctrine of Pakistan. According to him:

- “Pakistan’s policy will be based on a minimum credible deterrence.
- It will avoid getting embroiled in a strategic arms race with India.
- It will continue to support international arms control regimes, which are non-discriminatory in nature.
- Pakistan’s nuclear policy will be conducted with ‘restraint’ and ‘responsibility’.
- It will participate in the FMCT negotiations.
- It will refrain from further nuclear testing. However, this commitment is subject to change in case India decides to resume testing.
- Pakistan will strengthen existing controls on the export of nuclear technology through administrative and legal mechanisms” (Doctrine Year Not Mentioned).

According to Michael Krepon, “Among the principles of nuclear doctrine affirmed by senior Pakistani government officials and military officers, four appear to be of overriding importance. First, they assert that Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent is India-specific. Second, Pakistan has embraced a doctrine of credible, minimum deterrence, as noted above. Third, the requirements for credible, minimal deterrence are not fixed; instead, they are determined by a dynamic threat environment. And fourth, given India’s conventional military advantages, Pakistan reserves the option to use nuclear weapons first in extremis” (Krepon, 2012).

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are not India specific only. Pakistan’s nuclear arms had been under threat from Israel too as India and Israel has collaborated in the past to destroy the Pakistani nuclear program, particularly in 1980s, likewise after the military operation by US forces against Osama Bin Laden in Pakistani city Abbottabad on May 2, 2011 “Concerns over US designs against Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent were especially heightened” (Sultan, 2012).

Before Abbottabad raid, Dr. Lavoy had explained in June 2007 about the Pakistani doctrine in the following words by quoting the words of Pakistani military General Kidwai “Nuclear weapons are aimed solely at India. In case that deterrence fails, they will be used if:

- “India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory” (space threshold);
- “India destroys a large part either of its land or air forces” (military threshold);
- “India proceeds to the economic strangling of Pakistan” (economic strangling);

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- “India pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or creates a large-scale internal subversion in Pakistan” (domestic destabilization)” (Lavoy, 2007).

### **Pakistan’s Response to Nuclear Safety Challenges**

Pakistan responded the challenges pertaining to its nuclear program’s safety long ago. For instance the government of General Musharraf had established the National Command Authority (NCA) on 02 February 2000 in order to control the policy with respect to nuclear weapons. The National Command Authority is fully “responsible for policy formulation with employment and development control over all strategic nuclear forces and strategic organizations. It consists of an Employment Control Committee and a Development Control Committee, as well as the Strategic Plans Division which acts as its Secretariat” (FAS, 2002).

Pakistan Successfully established a tough “set of measures to assure the security of its nuclear weapons. These have been based on copying US practices, procedures and technologies, and comprise: a) physical security; b) personnel reliability programs; c) technical and procedural safeguards; and d) deception and secrecy. These measures provide the Pakistan Army’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD)—which oversees nuclear weapons operations—a high degree of confidence in the safety and security of the country’s nuclear weapons” (Gregory, 2009).

Selection process is tight in Pakistan army regarding personal reliability. In order to avoid personality problems, inappropriate external affiliations, sexual deviancy and sympathy with terrorists and personality problem, “Pakistan operates an analog to the US Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)” (Gregory, 2007).

According to a report published in New York Times on November 18, 2007 US spent handsome amount during George Walker Bush’s administration from 2001 to 2007. “Over the past six years, the Bush administration has spent almost \$100 million on a highly classified program to help Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s president, secure his country’s nuclear weapons.....A raft of equipment — from helicopters to night vision- goggles to nuclear detection equipment — was given to Pakistan to help secure its nuclear material, its warheads, and the laboratories that were the site of the worst known case of nuclear proliferation in the atomic age” (Sanger and Broad, 2007).

This amount of \$ 100 million in safety aid for nuclear weapons of Pakistan was merely 1% of total US aid given to Pakistan during 2001 to 2007.

In the wake of 9/11 attacks and before US invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 a debate started in Bush administration with the feelings that nuclear security

technology should be shared with Pakistan. “There were a lot of people who feared that once we headed into Afghanistan, the Taliban would be looking for these weapons” (Sanger and Broad, 2007).

Pakistani authorities had always been reluctant to provide US access to its nuclear sites due to deep suspicions. Pakistani authorities deemed that US had a secret objective to collect classified information about the location of nuclear weapons and disable the weapons if necessary.

## **Cost Benefit Analysis**

As it has been discussed earlier that Musharraf has explained the reason to join the war on terror on September 19, 2001 that “Our critical concerns are our sovereignty, second our economy, third our strategic assets (nuclear and missiles), and forth our Kashmir cause”. What cost Pakistan paid and what benefits Pakistan gained politically on the issue of strategic assets in decade from October 2001 to October 2011?

## **Benefits**

Traditional rivalry between the two neighboring countries India and Pakistan resulted in three large scale wars in 1948, 1965 and 1971. Pakistan has no match with India’s conventional fire power and armed forces. The nuclear capability changed the balance of power in the region between the both countries. According to the neorealism theory “States armed with nuclear weapons may have stronger incentives to avoid war than states armed conventionally” (Waltz, 2010).

This nuclear capability proved a deterrent to prevent the large scale wars on the following occasions:

- In Kargil conflict (May-July 1999)
  - Attacks in Delhi (Indian Parliament) December 13, 2001 and Attack on Indian held Kashmir State Assembly on October 01, 2001, which resulted into a standoff between both countries.
  - Mumbai attacks on November 26, 2009.
1. This was nuclear balance created in 199, which prevented the war between the both countries at least after 9/11.
  2. Pakistan has successfully increased its nuclear stockpile as compare to India .According to report published in Washington Post in January 2011 “Beyond intelligence on the ground, US officials assess Pakistan's nuclear weapons program with the same tools used by the outside experts

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- satellite photos of nuclear-related installations, estimates of fissile-material production and weapons development, and publicly available statements and facts. Four years ago, the Pakistani arsenal was estimated at 30 to 60 weapons.

"They have been expanding pretty rapidly," Albright said. Based on recently accelerated production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, "they could have more than doubled in that period," with current estimates of up to 110 weapons. Kristensen said it was "not unreasonable" to say that Pakistan has now produced at least 100 weapons. Shaun Gregory, director of the Pakistan Security Research Unit at Britain's University of Bradford, put the number at between 100 and 110" (DeYoung, 2011).

3. Pakistan not only succeeded to keep the balance of power but also increased its nuclear power and tactical weapons which prevented India to increase its hegemonic designs against Pakistan since 1971. Pakistan developed its tactical weapons "Nasr, a mobile dual-capable battlefield ballistic missile with a range of only 60 kilometers..... Indeed, Pakistan is even more of a puzzle on this score than India, given its constrained strategic geography, conspicuous anxiety about its conventional military shortcomings vis-à-vis its nemesis, and the profound influence of a military establishment renowned for worst-case strategizing" (KARL, 2014).
4. The issue of safety and security of nuclear arsenal and missile system had always been raised by US, western world and India systematically to keep Pakistan under intense pressure and create a bad image in the world community. US had a clear purpose to track Pakistani nuclear positions in which US failed and Pakistan successfully improved safety and security measures which pose a long term benefit for Pakistan. Denis Flory, Deputy Director General of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had said in April 2011 in Islamabad about the importance of national responsibility for security of nuclear arsenal, that Pakistan has taken this matter very seriously. He admitted and praised in the following words "In fact, Pakistan has had an Action Plan in place to strengthen nuclear security since 2006. This plan covers such items as Management of Radioactive Sources; Nuclear Security Emergency Co-ordination Center (NuSECC); Locating and Securing Orphan Radioactive Sources. Pakistan has worked with the agency to implement that plan and to provide resources for its implementation. Pakistan is the 10th largest contributor to the Nuclear Security Fund, contributing \$1.16 million. This is an

example of their strong leadership and commitment as well as their serious approach to nuclear security in the course of implementing its action plan. Over 200 people from Pakistan have attended IAEA training courses” (Dawn, 2014).

5. Pakistan has developed its best security and safety mechanism which covers 1) Physical protection, 2) border controls 3) material control and accounting, and finally 4) radiological emergencies.
6. “Pakistan’s decades-old struggle to improve precarious security predicament has provided security from its principal adversary- India. However, as Pakistan becomes an advanced nuclear state. It faces asymmetric threats to its security that require different instruments of conventional force backed up with political, diplomatic, and economic efforts” (Khan, 2012).
7. “No other nuclear power acquired a nuclear capability under such obstacles and in the face of efforts to derail the program; no other power without experience and support turned its rudimentary nuclear capability into operational deterrent forces; and no other power created robust command-and-control system and constructed a nuclear security regime under immense pressure from Western cynicism and internal security threats” (Khan, 2012).
8. Despite all allegations, suspicions and doubts, Pakistan proved that its security and safety mechanism is so strong that not even a single time its nuclear arsenal, facilities have come under threat. During 2001 to 2011 thousands of civilians and soldiers were killed due to terrorist attacks and economy almost ruined but nuclear program, missile and strategic assets remained safe and all doubts proved baseless.
9. Obama himself has to admit about the accuracy in the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear program in 2013. Obama “reiterated his confidence in Pakistan's commitment and dedication to nuclear security and recognized that Pakistan is fully engaged with the international community on nuclear safety and security issues” (NTI, 2013).

### **Cost (Losses)**

1. Dr.Qadeer Khan’s apology on Pakistan’s state run PTV on February 04, 2004 invited a series of criticism and doubts about the safety, security and proliferation of Pakistan’s nuclear program, which became a constant

source of US led western countries to damage Pakistan's image politically and diplomatically .It was a serious blow for Pakistan.

2. US as usual used Pakistan but later aligned with India, despite the fact that Pakistan worked with US as front line ally from 1979 to 1987 and later 2001 to 2014, Even US declared Pakistan as Major Non –NATO Allie in 2004. “The United States hoped to revive its cold war pattern of friendship with Pakistan, and to use Islamabad as a stabilizing influence in the region. In the Indian case, the flourishing India's economy gave the United States an unprecedented opening to gain economic and diplomatic advantages. The US did not, however, implement tangible, targeted, and sustained sanctions against India's nuclear weapons program. On the contrary, the US agreed to reschedule India's external debt, increased its economic assistance to India, and for a few years continued to supply nuclear fuel to India's nuclear reactors. The US provision of unconditional military, economic, and technological assistance to countries with active nuclear weapons programs highlighted the contradictions between its declared and operational non-proliferation policies” (Ashier, 2012).
3. U.S has discriminatory policies towards Pakistan. It supports India and discourages Pakistan and spread misinformation about the safety and security of Pakistani nuclear program and arsenals, whereas Pakistan always assure that Pakistan's nuclear program is safe and secure and it's not easy to understand.
4. US neglected Pakistan with regard to any nuclear cooperation deal and cooperated with India. On July 18, 2005, US president Bush decisively changed the policy clearly tilting towards “Raising India to the status of a strategic ally, he cut a unique exception in the global non-proliferation regime, proposing that India be allowed to keep its military stockpile even as it gained access to technologies and fuel for its civilian reactors. Over the next two years Mr. Bush used dwindling political capital to get the deal approved by the Congress and foreign governments. When Pakistan requested a similar pact, it was told that such deals were reserved for “responsible” states. However .... “new focus on India is also potentially dangerous for the world, because it neglects Pakistan.. Helping India while ignoring the pathological developments in Pakistan was no favor to India, let alone Pakistan” (Giridharadas, 2009).
5. The Indo US nuclear negotiations and deal which was started in 2005 when Bush visited India and finally signed in January 2015 on the visit of



India by Obama is a clear loss for Pakistan. Despite all human and material losses borne by Pakistan during war on terror, could not win the US and US finally supported India through the nuclear deal by leaving permanent security threats for Pakistan by India.

6. Through Indo-US nuclear deal, India will be able to “produce significant quantities of fissile material and nuclear weapons from unsafe guarded nuclear reactors which would adversely impact on strategic stability in the region” (Fisher, 2004).
7. The greatest benefit which India now enjoys is the legitimacy of the India Nuclear program, whereas Pakistan’s nuclear program is still under suspicions and worries regarding its safety and security.
8. Because of deal, the US has removed all of its sanctions related to transfer of nuclear technology. While Pakistan will remain under sanctions.
9. Now India will be treated as an exceptional country which is tantamount to acknowledge India as a de-facto nuclear power. Whereas Pakistan will have to face its effects.
10. Since this deal has made possible for India to acquire and raw materials, hardware, and latest technology from US, which is directly associated with the development of weapons program. This situation will change the balance of power in the region.
11. In the “long run, the deal gives India the opportunity to significantly strengthen its nuclear weapons program by building higher capacity reactors and enhancing the targeting efficiency of its nuclear arsenal. Furthermore, the de facto legitimacy would also allow India to proceed with its controversial nuclear programs under the cover of legitimacy with relative ease....The legitimacy provided by this deal to India’s nuclear program and the resultant diplomatic leverage it has acquired has made Pakistan’s longstanding quest to avoid becoming a satellite state much harder. Clearly, the deal is a tremendous boost for India’s ambitions of becoming a global power. While to date, its conflict with Pakistan and its poor track record in Kashmir had evaded the recognition of its status, the deal has overhauled the entire scenario in India’s favor. Pakistan, already increasingly seen as a troublemaker in the region since Kargil, will find it even harder to sell its view vis-à-vis India. The relationship certainly provides added leverage to India on issues such as terrorism and extremism where the US, and by extension all Western powers are sure to side with New Delhi even more candidly in the future. Moreover, stances

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on certain issues where Pakistan and India previously held converging interests will now be altered. NPT is a case in point. While India's need for a 5+2 formula still remains alive, it would now have subsided considerably, at least for the time being. This leaves Pakistan alone in the hunt to find a legitimate way into the nuclear club. New Delhi now has little incentive to stand on the same platform as Pakistan on the issue" (Yusuf, 2007).

12. US proved that Pakistan is its only war time ally therefore Pakistan is not important in peace days but India which is all time enemy of Pakistan is given preference .

## Conclusion

Dr. Kenneth Waltz had said that "In international affairs, force remains the final arbiter. Thus some have thought that by acquiring nuclear weapons third countries may reduce their distance from the great powers" (Waltz, 2010).

Pakistan started its nuclear program after Indian nuclear explosion in 1974. Pakistan had to face economic sanctions imposed by US and its western allies. It is difficult to "calculate the costs or benefits of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs. Citing the need for secrecy, New Delhi and Islamabad refuse to reveal what they spend on nuclear weapons or delivery systems. Based on likely labor, facility, and material costs, however, one can estimate that each state has allocated more than \$1 billion to design and manufacture a small number of nuclear-capable missiles (Prithvi and Agni for India, Ghauri and Shaheen for Pakistan). Each side is likely to have spent five times that figure for the production of fissile materials and the manufacture of a few nuclear weapons. These are only some of the costs involved in their emerging nuclear and missile programs. Of greater concern is the price Islamabad and New Delhi must pay to establish credible and secure nuclear deterrent forces in the future. According to one Indian estimate, a single Agni missile costs as much as the annual operation of 13,000 health care centers. More than 3,000 public housing units could be built for the price of one nuclear warhead. The expenditures required to develop India's "minimum" deterrent could meet 25 percent of the yearly costs of sending every Indian child to school. Nearly all Pakistani children could be educated and fed for the cost of the nuclear and missile arsenal that is being created for their protection" (Lavoy, 1999). Furthermore Pakistan incurred a huge amount. Exact amount is yet unknown but some sources have revealed the amount which is not accurate due to the nature of secrecy. However according to some other estimates "cost of building

the bomb in last 20 years (1978 –98) at Rs. 20 Billion. This translates into about \$5.5 Billion after adjusting for exchange rate. M Ziauddin, another Pakistani analyst has estimated the cost of nuclear deterrence against India at \$10 to 15 Billion. This amount probably includes missiles and 30 or so nuclear bombs. These costs also include expenditures on command and control devices” (Sud, 2004).

“For a country like Pakistan, having the nuclear bomb means that it has the ultimate strategic defense. Wars are bad for the economy and nuclear deterrence is a best tool to avoid wars. A short conventional war between India and Pakistan would cost Islamabad U.S \$ 350 million per day. Now one can easily estimate economic deprivation if Pakistan had to face another 1971 debacle without having any nuclear weapon. In contrast to conventional warfare, nuclear deterrence has made wars between nuclear states rationally non-viable” (Ehtisham, 2015).

Pakistan has gained less and lost more in regard to nuclear program and objective to join the war on terror. Indo US Nuclear deal of 2005-2015 has become a threat for Pakistan.

Now India again will be in a position to change the nuclear balance after 2015. It's true that during the period of 2001 to 2011, Pakistan was able to maintain the nuclear balance of power in the region. According to Advisor to Prime Minister On National and Security and Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz responded as saying that “ Indo-US nuclear deal struck for "political and economic expediencies" would have a detrimental impact on nuclear deterrence and overall stability in South Asia” (Dawn, 2015).

In short the objective of Musharraf to join the war on terror in order to save the “strategic assets (nuclear and missiles)” partially was achieved during 2001 to 2011, despite huge misconception created by US and its allies including India related to safety and security of nuclear program. Therefore, despite heavy cost incurred financially and politically the benefit side was high as it helped in balance of power in the region and saved Pakistan from external particularly Indian attack.

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Americans are increasingly frustrated with Pakistan's counterterrorism efforts, but the United States should resist the urge to threaten President Pervez Musharraf or demand a quick democratic transition. Getting Islamabad to play a more effective role in the war on terrorism will require that Washington strike a careful balance: pushing for political reform but without jeopardizing the military's core interests.

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